The German Federal election of 2002 may have marked the beginning of the end for the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), at least as a political actor at federal level.
Until then, the party, which is directly descended from the ruling communist party of the GDR, the Socialist Unity Party (SED), had defied its critics and increased its vote share at every successive federal election. Over the past decade scholars and journalists have tried to categorise the PDS, either as a protest party, an anti-system party, a milieu party, a socialist reform party, or a regional party. 1 Of all these categories, the latter is perhaps the most convincing, given that the party's support is concentrated in eastern Germany, although it does combine elements of all these labels. Dan Hough sees similarities between the PDS and other European regional/nationalist parties, and concludes: 'the PDS is not a socialist party that happens to be particularly strong in one region of the country; rather, it is a regional party built on socialist principles'. 2 Indeed, the PDS is often described as the 'CSUOst', thereby equating it with the Christian Social Union, which has successfully survived in the post-war German party system as the articulator of Bavarian interests.
However, the key difference between the PDS and other regional parties is that it does not want to operate only in eastern Germany. Instead it claims to be a modern socialist party for all Germans, albeit one with special responsibility for the East. The party's aim of building support in western Germany is the focus of this article. The article considers why the leadership of the PDS advocates western expansion and to what extent this has the support of the majority of the party. It looks at the strategies employed to achieve this aim, and to what extent they have been successful.
Particular reference is made to the 2002 federal election. It also looks at the nature and composition of the western PDS. Finally, a case study of the party's attempts to transcend the east-west divide in Berlin will be presented, since the reunited city is the only 'east-west Land' in the Federal Republic and as such, has provided the PDS with a testing ground for its strategies for western expansion in general.
In short, the party is attempting to exploit a centre-periphery cleavage, or perhaps more accurately, a territorial-cultural cleavage, 3 and a class cleavage simultaneously.
This has generated an east-west conflict within the party, with territorial and ideological dimensions. Even so, as this article demonstrates, the party leadership is unwilling to accept that its federal ambitions are incompatible with the reality of its eastern German appeal, and that the western expansion campaign is unlikely to succeed.
THE PDS: A MODERN SOCIALIST PARTY FOR THE WHOLE OF GERMANY?
No other German party enjoys such a markedly different level of support in the east and west of the Federal Republic as the PDS. Ironically its concentrated support in the eastern Länder secured its position in German politics at federal level. In particular its strongholds in East Berlin used to provide the party with a safety net because any party winning three constituency seats (which are contested using a majoritarian system) automatically gains entry into the Bundestag, even if its overall proportion of the national vote is below five percent. 4 The eastern PDS is also highly heterogeneous encompassing a wide range of political views and appealing to people retains the claim to be a 'democratic and emancipatory, modern socialist party, operating nationwide'. 6 The party's federal election manifestos have reiterated the claim to be a genuine federal party. The 1998 manifesto emphasised its socialist policies and explicitly stated: 'We want to represent these goals nation-wide, in the West as well as the East. They determine our special responsibility in Eastern
Germany, not as a regional party, but as a socialist party for the Federal Republic.' 7 According to the manifesto, many of eastern Germany's problems were merely the heightened difficulties of the country as a whole. In the manifesto for the 2002 federal election the portrayal of the PDS as a socialist party for Germany as a whole was even more marked. Only one section dealt with eastern Germany specifically and reference was made to the need to stop thinking and acting along east-west lines. 8 The message would appear to be that the PDS, as a socialist party, stands up for the socially disadvantaged and for minorities who lack a political voice, and many eastern Germans fit these categories in today's Federal Republic.
However, references to discrimination against eastern Germans and to reunification as the 'annexation of the GDR', and criticism of attempts to 'westernise' eastern Germany in other party documents may undermine the party's appeal to western
Germans. This is the key dilemma for the PDS: can it maintain its support in the eastern Länder, while simultaneously attempting to appeal to left-wingers in the western Länder with socialist rhetoric? In other words, can it simultaneously benefit from territorial-cultural and class cleavages? This dilemma was highlighted by arguments provoked by the publication of the 'Rostock Manifesto' in the spring of 1998 -a document that focused specifically on the economic situation in the eastern Länder. A particularly controversial proposal was a veto right for the eastern Länder in the upper house, the Bundesrat. To critics the manifesto appeared to be an admission that the PDS was essentially an eastern German regional party and an acknowledgement of the failure of its western expansion plans. 9 The campaign to increase support in the West enjoys the support of many highly influential figures within the party. They include the current federal Chair Lothar Bisky, and his predecessor, Gabi Zimmer, the party's chief ideologist André Brie, and the PDS's best known politician, former parliamentary party leader, Gregor Gysi. The campaign is also supported by the far left within the party, including the high profile Communist Platform and the Marxist Forum since their agendas are more ideological than regional.
However, opponents of the western expansion campaign have not remained silent.
One of the most outspoken is Christine Ostrowski, a former Bundestag MP from Saxony, who together with a colleague published a 'Letter from Saxony' in 1996, which sparked a widespread debate about the party's objectives and identity. The document overtly called for the abandonment of the PDS's western expansion plan and for its self-promotion as an eastern German people's party. The authors claimed that the attempt to establish the PDS in the West had failed, in spite of the injection of material and personal resources. They advocated co-operation between the eastern PDS and existing western left-wing groups, as opposed to courting the western left, which might hinder the consolidation of the PDS as an eastern German people's party.
They also argued that what the party understood by 'modern socialism' should be determined by the day-to-day experiences of its millions of supporters in the eastern
Länder. 10 The 'Letter from Saxony' challenged official party policy, and highlighted a fact obvious to most outsiders, namely that the aim of representing eastern interests was (and is) incompatible with the aim of western expansion. A second 'letter' followed stating that while the PDS leadership might want the support of western Germans, the latter clearly did not want the PDS.
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The two 'letters' provoked considerable criticism, especially from western German members and from the Communist Platform. 12 Furthermore, an extensive survey of PDS members carried out in 2000 revealed that only 17 per cent of eastern members believed the party should remain an Ost-Partei. 13 Given that the representation of eastern interests appeared to be a winning strategy for the PDS, and that it can make a reasonable claim to be an eastern German people's party based on its ability to attract voters from most social groups, 14 
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Major cultural and ideological differences exist between PDS members in the east and west of Germany, as the federal leadership is well aware. 28 The aforementioned members' survey revealed that 79 per cent of eastern members and 73 per cent of western members believed there were too many misunderstandings and conflicts between the two camps. 29 While the party in the East concerns itself with practical issues such as social justice and the equality for East Germans, many members in the West cling to orthodox views of class conflict, and have a reputation for being more interested in debating Marxism and dreaming of the revolution than devising concrete 9 solutions to social problems. Because a large proportion of Eastern members do not hold radical left-wing views, the more ideologically motivated western activists regard many eastern PDS voters as the 'wrong kind' of supporters who may have to be shed in order to attract the 'right kind', namely socialists in the West. 30 Ideological differences between the eastern and western PDS came to a head with a row over patriotism in 2000. The then federal chair, Gabi Zimmer, used the phrase 'I love Germany' in a speech and claimed she saw nothing wrong with using words such as 'patriotism', 'nation' and 'Germany'. 31 Zimmer was accused of Deutschtümelei (hypergermaness) 32 by western activists, and by some eastern left-wingers who claimed that words such as 'nation' and 'Germany' were the preserve of the far right and irrelevant for the cause of socialism. They also believed that such language would offend left-wingers in western Germany, thereby further reducing the party's low levels of support there. 33 Overall the acrimonious debate highlighted how the mission of the PDS was perceived differently by eastern and western members. For the former it remained a party with special responsibility for the interests of all East
Germans, while for the latter its role was defined in terms of the class struggle. The debate provoked fears of a split between the territorially orientated and the ideologically driven factions and of the end of the PDS as an all-German project. 34 Following the PDS's federal election defeat in 2002 many of the party's federal executive declined to stand for reelection. Most of those who stood down were members of the party's reformist wing and their departure allowed orthodox leftwingers, including several from the West, to take over key roles including deputy party chair and party secretary. 35 Clashes between these two individuals and the then federal chair, Gabi Zimmer, over the future direction of the party soon made the new executive unworkable, and provoked the most serious leadership crisis since the foundation of the party. The party secretary had accused the eastern branches of trying to turn the PDS into an eastern regional party, subservient to the SPD, and claimed that only the 'wisdom of the western left' could transform the PDS into a proper nationwide socialist party. However other party speakers from the West publicly distanced themselves from these comments, claiming that the PDS's strength in the East was a precondition for its growth in the West. 36 After just eight months in In short, while for other parties in the Federal Republic the eastern or western
German origins of members are increasingly irrelevant, the same cannot be said of the PDS. According to some western activists, they are still not considered to be a normal part of the party and they feel badly treated by the eastern majority. They have accused outspoken eastern politicians like Christine Ostrowski of 'eastern fixated arrogance'. 38 In the words of one commentator, the western PDS members are the Ossis of the party, treated worse by the leadership than eastern members of western-based parties.
STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING SUPPORT IN THE WESTERN LÄNDER
Over the past three years the PDS's election campaigns in western Germany have been noticeably more active, although a coherent strategy to be used across the fewer than in 1998. 56 Only in Hamburg and Bremen did the party poll over two per cent of the vote. However the party's disappointing performance in the West was overshadowed by its disastrous overall result, which saw the PDS Fraktion shrink from 37 (including five members from western Länder) to just two. However, due to surprisingly heavy loses in the East, the western vote as a proportion of the PDS's overall vote grew from around a sixth in 1998 to nearly a quarter in 2002. 57 
Land and Local Elections
Even with a proportional representation electoral German system, many voters may be deterred from voting for small parties because their vote will be wasted if the party fails to clear the five percent hurdle. However, as mentioned earlier, this deterrent does not apply for local elections and may explain why the PDS has had some success at this level in the West. In total the PDS currently has over a hundred seats in local assemblies in the western Länder. 58 In local elections in North Rhine-Westphalia in from central party coffers to help finance the election campaign. 67 However, now almost invisible at federal level, the PDS seemed even less relevant to the voters of Bremen, only 1.67 per cent of whom voted PDS, compared with 2.8 per cent in 1999. 68 While the PDS's electoral support in the West is consistent, in real terms it remains very low. What is remarkable is the continued optimism of local activists in the West, and their ability to look forward to the next election opportunity in spite of disappointing election results, dismissive remarks from the media, and less than whole-hearted support from the bulk of the party in the East.
EXPLAINING THE PDS'S POOR PERFORMANCE IN THE WEST
Various factors help to explain why the PDS has failed to establish itself in western
Germany. The most obvious is the simple fact that in both the East and the West of the Federal Republic the party is perceived by the public as an eastern regional party, as opinion polls confirm. 69 Many of the PDS's activities reinforce this view, for example, campaigns to increase pensions for eastern Germans, to save street names commemorating communist heroes from GDR times, 70 and to preserve the asbestos- 
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The aforementioned controversy surrounding the Hamburg party executive was another case of bad publicity for the western PDS. Overall the makeup of the western PDS is clearly a problem if the party is to grow and become consolidated there. Its activists are young, radical, politically inexperienced, and lack a long-term sense of allegiance to the party, hence the turnover of members is high.
According to the former parliamentary party leader, Roland Claus, the stabilising of personnel in the West is vital if the western expansion is to succeed. 73 The relentless smear campaigns waged by other parties, in particular the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the CSU, have not helped matters. While the infamous 'red socks' campaign led by the CDU (which equated the PDS with the SED of the past) backfired in the East, it did find resonance in the West. 74 An additional factor which damages the party's image in the West is the fact that several groups within the PDS are monitored by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, which western
Germans might interpret as a sign that the party poses a threat to democracy.
Meanwhile the Communist Platform attributes the party's lack of support in the West to the economic and social structure of western Germany and to its claim that there are too many 'beneficiaries of globalization' there. Secondly, the more natural choices for western left-wing voters, the SPD and the Greens, both played trump cards during the election campaign. In the case of the SPD this was a strong anti-war stance, in the case of the Greens, a campaign focusing on their best asset, the popular foreign minister, Joschka Fischer.
The party's inability to increase its support in the West in 2002 seemed to vindicate those who opposed the Westaufbau in principle, especially since the aim to appeal nationwide appeared to have cost votes in the East. However, Gabi Zimmer still maintained that the party could not be allowed to retreat into the East, for to do so would mean the end of 'any claim to socialism'. 77 Her former deputy, Petra Pau MP, agreed that the PDS should continue to operate nation-wide in spite of the election defeat, 78 a view shared by the western Land branches. However long-standing opponents of the Westaufbau of the PDS like Christine Ostrowski called for an end to the 'crazy idea' that the PDS was a party for the whole of Germany. In her view, its eastern identity was the PDS's own trump card, one that should be played to its full advantage.
WEST BERLIN: A TESTING GROUND FOR THE PDS
Berlin is the only Land in the Federal Republic that comprises territory from the former GDR and the old West Germany. As such Berlin functions as a testing ground for the PDS's aspiration to become a modern socialist party for all Germans. Some of the most prominent PDS politicians at federal level, such as Gregor Gysi, originate from East Berlin, hence there is considerable overlap between the personnel and objectives of the federal party and the Berlin Land party. An added bonus is the high membership level in the eastern part of the city which gives the party a strong local base from which target West Germans on its doorstep. The Berlin PDS has around 14,500 members, although only around 500 live in the west of the city. 80 Leading PDS politicians like Petra Pau have for years regarded the future of the Berlin PDS as city-wide or non-existent. 81 However, logic suggests that the party may not be able to as opposed to separate lists in each borough. 87 Right from the start, Gysi's campaign was directed at voters across the capital. He utilised a common tactic in Berlin elections, namely appealing to Berliners' pride in their home city. Conscious that many people regarded the PDS as a divisive force in the capital, he declared, 'I stand for bridges not walls'. 88 Opinion polls showed that across Berlin Gysi had the highest recognition rating of all the mayoral candidates, 89 and that the proportion of Berliners who would chose him as mayor, if they could elect one directly, was considerably higher than the proportion who normally voted PDS. 90 The Berlin PDS argued that the two parts of the city faced the same problems, in particular, unemployment, which is at eastern German levels on both sides of the capital. 91 The 2001 Land election manifesto, entitled 'Together for Berlin', focused on economic and social issues, on the need to banish corruption from Berlin politics, and to deal with the city's catastrophic financial situation. 92 However, immediately after the events of September 11 th , the foreign policy of the federal PDS had a negative impact on the poll ratings of the Berlin PDS. In the long term, the PDS will either have to retain a very high level of support in the east of the capital, or make inroads into the West to secure its future there. Both the federal and local party leaderships favour the latter option, not least because party has been losing approximately 2,000 members in East Berlin per year. Until recently, it appeared that if the PDS could make it anywhere in Western Germany it would be in the inner city areas of western Berlin, renowned for high levels of left-wing activism.
But now the party is no longer a player at federal level, the chance to establish a permanent support base in West Berlin may have passed. Overall, the dilemmas of the PDS in Berlin are essentially local manifestations of the overall problem the party faces, namely how to be a modern socialist party and the representative of eastern German interests simultaneously.
CONCLUSION
This article has shown how the leadership of the PDS has aspired to become a nationwide, 'modern socialist party', albeit one with special responsibility of the East.
However, even if it is unintentional, election results and membership data show that the PDS is de facto an East German regional party. For the majority of its core supporters the party's eastern German origins and culture are paramount, whereas for the western German minority it is a vehicle for the struggle against capitalism.
Indeed, for over a decade, the PDS has been more than a party in the East, while in the West it is rather less than one. In the eastern Länder it has provided camaraderie and activities to replace those lost with the demise of the GDR -an eastern niche in today's western orientated German society for those used to the old Nischengesellschaft (niche society) of the past. Until 2002 its continued electoral success in the East suggested its development and maturation had kept pace with changes in the lives of its eastern voters. As a result it evolved from the party of the old GDR into the party of contemporary eastern Germany. However these factors continued to hinder its ability to establish itself in the west of the country.
The problems facing the PDS demonstrate the difficulties parties face by attempting to exploit a territorial-cultural cleavage and a class cleavage simultaneously. In the end, trying to become a genuine federal party without losing its core supporters may be the PDS's undoing. 104 The evidence suggests that it was the PDS's eastern distinctiveness and the fact that it was not like the western-based parties that had hitherto been the key to its success. Paradoxically, its concentrated regional appeal earned it a place in the German party system at federal level.
However, recent elections suggest not only that the western expansion is doomed to failure, but also that the party may have no future beyond Land and local politics in eastern Germany. The disastrous result of the 2002 federal election inevitably provoked acrimonious internal debate regarding the very nature and identity of the PDS. Deep ideological rifts within the party became obvious, as did the underlying east-west conflict. Although the influence of western hardliners has been removed from the party executive, a split between the ideologically motivated on the one hand, and the regionally orientated on the other is not unthinkable. 105 The federal chair, Lothar Bisky, maintains that the party only has a future as an allGerman party, 106 and the new Party Programme (as yet unratified) commits the party to operate nationwide. 107 However even in the highly politicised 1960s and 1970s, indigenous far left-wing parties failed to make an impact in West Germany. The likelihood of a socialist party 'made in East Germany' finding success in the West looks very slim indeed.
